The House's policy reversal on gun control: Agency discretion and the durability of interest group deals

摘要

Purpose – This paper aims to examine why a legislature would repeal an interest group deal. Design/methodology/approach–This paper provides a case study of the House of Representatives’ roll call reversal on the Brady Bill. The House voted against the Brady Bill in 1988 giving a victory to pro-gun interest groups. It then reversed itself and voted for the Brady Bill in 1993. Findings – This paper finds that changes in the democratic party leadership may be responsible for the House's policy reversal on gun control. Practical implications – These findings suggest that in a principal–agent relationship, the agent has some discretion. In this case, the principal (elected members of a party in the US House) hires an agent (its leadership) to organize their teamwork to produce legislative output. The leadership has some discretion in making interest group deals. Originality/value – The paper shows how changes in leadership reduce the durability of interest group deals.