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Philosophy and reflection: A critique of Frank Welz’s sociological and “processual” criticism of Husserl and Schutz

机译:哲学与反思:对弗兰克·韦尔茨对胡塞尔和舒茨的社会学和“过程性”批评的批评

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摘要

Frank Welz’s Kritik der Lebenswelt undertakes a sociology of knowledge criticism of the work of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz that construes them as developing absolutist, egological systems opposed to the “processual” worldview prominent since the modern rise of natural science. Welz, though, misunderstands the work of Schutz and Husserl and neglects how their focus on consciousness and eidetic features pertains to the kind of reflection that one must undertake if one would avoid succumbing to absolutism, that uncovers the presuppositions of the processual worldview itself, and that secures a domain distinctive of philosophy over against sociology. Finally, Welz’s charge that Schutz favors a Neo-Kantian social scientific methodology contradictory to his phenomenology neglects the levels of Schutz’s discourse and ignores how the Weberian ideal-typical approach can be subsumed within phenomenology.
机译:弗兰克·韦尔兹(Frank Welz)的克里斯蒂克·德·勒本斯维尔(Kritik der Lebenswelt)对埃德蒙·胡塞尔(Edmund Husserl)和阿尔弗雷德·舒茨(Alfred Schutz)的著作进行了知识社会学批评,认为它们是发展中的专制主义,生态系统,与自自然科学的现代兴起以来突出的“过程”世界观相反。但是,韦尔兹误解了舒茨和胡塞尔的作品,而忽略了他们对意识和意识形态特征的关注如何与一种思考有关,即如果人们避免屈服于专制主义,就必须进行这种反思,从而揭示了过程世界观本身的前提,并且从而确保了与社会学相比哲学领域的独特之处。最后,韦尔兹指责舒茨赞成一种与他的现象学相矛盾的新康德社会科学方法论,却忽略了舒茨的话语水平,而忽略了韦伯主义的理想-典型方法如何被包含在现象学中。

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