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首页> 外文期刊>Health Policy and Planning >Does household enrolment reduce adverse selection in a voluntary health insurance system? Evidence from the Ghanaian National Health Insurance System
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Does household enrolment reduce adverse selection in a voluntary health insurance system? Evidence from the Ghanaian National Health Insurance System

机译:家庭登记是否会减少自愿医疗保险系统中的逆向选择?来自加纳国民健康保险系统的证据

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摘要

In August 2003, the Ghanaian Government made history by implementing the first National Health Insurance System (NHIS) in sub-Saharan Africa. Within 2 years, over one-third of the country had voluntarily enrolled in the NHIS. To discourage households from selectively enrolling their sickest (high-risk) members, the NHIS in the Nkoranza district offered premium waivers for all children under 18 in exchange for full household enrolment. This study aimed to test whether, despite this incentive, there is evidence suggestive of adverse selection. To accomplish this, we examined how the observed pay-off from insurance (odds and intensity of medical consumption) responds to changes in the family enrolment cost. If adverse selection were present, we would expect the odds and intensity of medical consumption to increase with family enrolment cost. A number of econometric tests were conducted using the claims database of the NHIS in Nkoranza. Households with full enrolment were analysed, for a total of 58 516 individuals from 12 515 households. Our results show that household enrolment cost is not correlated with (1) odds or intensity of inpatient use or (2) odds of adult outpatient use, and is weakly correlated with the intensity of outpatient use. We also find that household enrolment costs are positively correlated with the number of children in the household and the odds and intensity of outpatient use by children. Thus, we conclude that the child-premium waiver is an important incentive for household enrolment. This evidence suggests that adverse selection has effectively been contained, but not eliminated. We argue that since one of the main objectives of the NHIS was to increase use of necessary care, especially by children, our findings indicate a largely favourable policy outcome, but one that may carry negative financial consequences. Policy makers must balance the fiscal need to contain costs with the societal objective to cover vulnerable populations.
机译:2003年8月,加纳政府通过在撒哈拉以南非洲实施第一个国家健康保险系统(NHIS)创造了历史。在2年内,超过三分之一的国家自愿加入了NHIS。为了阻止家庭有选择地招收最病的(高风险)成员,Nkoranza区的NHIS为所有18岁以下的儿童提供了保费减免,以换取全部家庭入学。这项研究旨在测试尽管有这种动机,是否有证据表明不利选择。为此,我们检查了观察到的保险收益(奇数和医疗消费强度)对家庭入学成本变化的反应。如果存在逆向选择,我们预计医疗费用的几率和强度会随着家庭入学费用的增加而增加。使用Nkoranza NHIS的索赔数据库进行了许多计量经济学测试。分析了充分登记的家庭,来自12 515户的58 516人。我们的结果表明,家庭入学费用与(1)住院使用的几率或强度或(2)成人门诊使用的几率均不相关,而与门诊使用的强度几近相关。我们还发现,家庭入学费用与家庭中儿童的数量以及儿童门诊使用的几率和强度呈正相关。因此,我们得出的结论是,免收儿童保费是家庭入学的重要诱因。该证据表明,逆向选择已得到有效遏制,但并未消除。我们认为,由于NHIS的主要目标之一是增加必要护理的使用,尤其是儿童的使用,因此我们的发现表明,该政策的结果在很大程度上是有利的,但可能会带来负面的财务后果。决策者必须在控制成本的财政需求与覆盖脆弱人群的社会目标之间取得平衡。

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  • 来源
    《Health Policy and Planning》 |2012年第5期|p.429-437|共9页
  • 作者单位

    1United States Agency for International Development, Washington DC, USA, 2Institute for Collaborative Development, Rockville MD, USA and 3Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Department of Health Policy and Management, Baltimore, MD, USA;

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