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Using deep Q-learning to understand the tax evasion behavior of risk-averse firms

机译:使用深度Q学习了解规避风险的公司的逃税行为

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Designing tax policies that are effective in curbing tax evasion and maximize state revenues requires a rigorous understanding of taxpayer behavior. This work explores the problem of determining the strategy a self-interested, risk-averse tax entity is expected to follow, as it "navigates" - in the context of a Markov Decision Process - a government-controlled tax environment that includes random audits, penalties and occasional tax amnesties. Although simplified versions of this problem have been previously explored, the mere assumption of risk-aversion (as opposed to risk-neutrality) raises the complexity of finding the optimal policy well beyond the reach of analytical techniques. Here, we obtain approximate solutions via a combination of Q-learning and recent advances in Deep Reinforcement Learning. By doing so, we (i) determine the tax evasion behavior expected of the taxpayer entity, (ii) calculate the degree of risk aversion of the "average" entity given empirical estimates of tax evasion, and (iii) evaluate sample tax policies, in terms of expected revenues. Our model can be useful as a testbed for "in-vitro" testing of tax policies, while our results lead to various policy recommendations. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:设计有效遏制偷税漏税和最大化国家税收的税收政策,需要对纳税人行为有严格的了解。这项工作探讨了在“马尔可夫决策过程”的背景下,确定一个自利的,规避风险的税收实体应遵循的策略的问题,该策略是由政府控制的税收环境,其中包括随机审计,罚款和偶尔的税收大赦。尽管以前已经探讨过此问题的简化版本,但仅对风险规避(与风险中立相反)的假设增加了寻找最佳策略的复杂性,而这远远超出了分析技术的范围。在这里,我们通过结合Q学习和深度强化学习的最新进展来获得近似解决方案。通过这样做,我们(i)确定纳税人实体的预期逃税行为,(ii)根据逃税的经验估算,计算“平均”实体的风险规避程度,以及(iii)评估示例税收政策,就预期收入而言。我们的模型可以用作税制“体外”测试的测试平台,而我们的结果可以得出各种政策建议。 (C)2018 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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