THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH TO JUSTICE AND THE FLOURISHING OF NONSENTIENT LIFE

摘要

In Frontiers of Justice, Martha Nussbaum expands the capabilities approach to justice to include sentient nonhuman animals. As for humans, justice requires that sentient animals have access to capabilities necessary for their flourishing, as specified by a "species norm." I argue that if Nussbaum's extension to nonhuman animals is cogent, then we can extend justice to nonsentient life. First, Nussbaum equivocates between an objective and a subjective definition of "flourishing," but the capabilities approach only needs an objective definition for determining the scope of justice. Second, drawing on Lori Gruen (1994) and Donna Haraway's (1998) work, I argue that nonsentient life can be considered a subject or agent insofar as it is a producer, not merely a product. Third, I suggest a relational, political conception of dignity that applies to nonsentient life. I also suggest that we best account for justice toward nonsentient life by accounting for justice within ecosystems.