Personal injury in private nuisance: the historical truth about actionability of 'bodily security'

摘要

This article has argued that the decision of the Court of Appeal to exclude personal injury from private nuisance law in Corby is flawed because of the reliance that it places on Newark's famous but unsound analysis of the 'boundaries of nuisance'. Newark advanced two broad arguments in support of the thesis that the inclusion of personal injury within private nuisance is a heresy. One is an argument which appeals to history - to the true legalrnposition at the original conception of this tort. The other is a jurisprudential argument - which encompasses what, as a matter of principle, the position ought to be in the modern day. Here the concern is with the former argument that personal injury is part of the original conception of the law; whether or not it ought to remain that way in the future is a matter for jurists not solely historians to settle.