Energy efficiency investments in the context of split incentives among French households

摘要

The residential sector offers considerable potential for reducing energy use and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly through energy-efficient renovations. The objective of this study is twofold. First, I aim to provide initial empirical evidence of the extent to which split incentives between landlords and tenants may lead to underinvestment. Second, I investigate the influence of tax credits and energy burdens on energy efficiency expenditures. Given the complexity of studying the decision to invest in energy-saving renovations, I use a bivariate Tobit model to compare decisions about energy-efficient works and repair works, even when the renovation expenditures seem quite similar. The analysis shows that tenants are doubly penalized: they have high energy expenditures due to energy-inefficient building characteristics, and because they are poorer than homeowners, they are unable to invest in energy-saving systems. The results also confirm that tax credits are ineffective in the split incentives context. In terms of public policy, the government should focus on low-income tenants, and mandatory measures such as minimum standards seem appropriate. Financial support from a third-party financer also might be a solution. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.