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Pay-performance sensitivity and risk-taking behaviors: Evidence from closed-end funds

机译:薪酬绩效敏感性和冒险行为:封闭式基金的证据

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The pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of managers of closed-end funds is explicitly specified in their contracts as the marginal rate of the funds' net asset value. Using a sample of US closed-end funds from 2006 to 2009, this paper investigates the relationship between the PPS and risk-taking behaviors of fund managers. After controlling for endogeneity, we find that fund return volatility and fund PPS positively determine each other. Furthermore, the positive relationship is more pronounced for closed-end funds engaging in alternative investments or in emerging markets. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:封闭式基金经理的薪酬绩效敏感性(PPS)在其合同中明确指定为基金资产净值的边际率。本文使用2006年至2009年的美国封闭式基金样本,研究了PPS与基金经理的冒险行为之间的关系。在控制了内生性之后,我们发现基金收益波动性和基金PPS相互之间具有积极的关系。此外,对于从事另类投资或新兴市场的封闭式基金,这种积极关系更为明显。 (C)2016 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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