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The Bobolink Project: Selling Public Goods From Ecosystem Services Using Provision Point Mechanisms

机译:Bobolink项目:使用供应点机制从生态系统服务中出售公共物品

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We report a two-year field experiment that solicited residents of Jamestown, Rhode Island, USA, to fund contracts with farmers willing to provide public goods associated with improving the nesting success of grassland birds, particularly the Bobolink. This experiment explores the potential to leverage valuation research for the purpose of enhancing charitable contributions in a manner consistent with developing markets for ecosystem-service public goods; we focus on individuals' willingness to contribute revenue. The direct-mail marketing experiment collected over $16,000 through four provision point, money-back guarantee mechanisms: a voluntary contribution mechanism with a proportional rebate; a pivotal mechanism based on the Clarke tax; and two novel uniform price mechanisms, each presented in discrete choice and open-ended response formats. We find thatcitizens do respond strategically: consistently lower offers in the open-ended format suggest a high incidence of cheap riding, but also a significant effect of higher suggested offer thresholds. These framing effects dominated differences among mechanisms, as revenue generated from the proportional rebate and one of the uniform price mechanisms approached the potential for revenue generation estimated under the incentive compatible pivotal mechanism. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:我们报告了一项为期两年的野外试验,该试验征集了美国罗得岛州詹姆斯敦的居民,以资助与愿意提供与改善草地鸟类(尤其是Bobolink)筑巢成功相关的公共物品的农民的合同。该实验探索了利用估值研究来以与发展生态系统服务公共产品市场一致的方式增加慈善捐款的潜力;我们关注个人贡献收入的意愿。直接邮件营销实验通过四个准备金,退款保证机制(一种具有一定比例折扣的自愿捐款机制),16,000美元来收集收入。基于克拉克税的关键机制;以及两种新颖的统一价格机制,每种机制均采用离散选择和开放式响应格式。我们发现,公民确实会做出战略性的回应:开放式格式的持续较低报价暗示了廉价骑行的发生率很高,但较高的建议阈值也产生了重大影响。这些成帧效应主导了机制之间的差异,因为按比例回扣和统一价格机制之一产生的收入接近在激励兼容的关键机制下估计的创收潜力。 (C)2017 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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