Editor's Introduction

摘要

The role of good institutions and of an effective legal system in promoting economic prosperity and growth is widely appreciated, leading to efforts to combat corruption by many governments as well as by international agencies such as the World Bank. Less well understood is what kinds of agents engage in corruption. In the case of firms that engage in corrupt behavior, is it due to the personal characteristics of the owners or managers, or can it be explained by the characteristics of the firm itself? In the first paper in this issue, Narek Sahakyan and Kyle W. Stiegert address this issue using data on firms in Armenia, a country that appears to have high levels of corruption. They find that corruption is more "acceptable" and seems to be more beneficial to the firm if the firm faces less competition in product markets, if it is large relative to its peers, and if it is relatively new. However, the personal characteristics of the respondents had much less explanatory power in identifying firms that viewed corruption as beneficial. This suggests that corruption can be attacked by government policies that influence the characteristics of the population of firms.