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Research on Supply Chain Governance Strategy: game value analysis based on Incomplete Contract Theory

机译:供应链治理策略研究:基于不完整合同理论的游戏价值分析

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There are potential opportunistic risks in the partnerships of enterprises in different industries. Asymmetric information, incomplete decision-making and Human bounded rationality are factors for the formation of opportunistic risks, and adopting external governance is a feasible way to defuse the risks. Supply chain governance is a new type of governance which is different from enterprise governance. Its scope of governance is wider than enterprise governance. It is the performance of environmental evolution and organizational innovation. Based on the incomplete contract, this paper analyzes the game between the supplier and the manufacturer. It is found that in the process of the game, the cooperation benefits of both parties are the largest and the distribution of benefits is the fairest. Therefore, combined with the theory of supply chain governance, this paper hopes to maximize the value of supply chain by optimizing the supply chain governance strategy under the condition of incomplete contract.
机译:在不同行业的企业伙伴关系中存在潜在的机会主义风险。不对称信息,不完整的决策和人为有限的合理性是形成机会主义风险的因素,采用外部治理是一种可行的方式来消除风险。供应链治理是一种与企业治理不同的新型治理。其治理范围比企业治理更广泛。它是环境进化和组织创新的表现。基于不完整的合同,本文分析了供应商和制造商之间的游戏。有人发现,在游戏过程中,双方的合作效益是最大的,福利分配是最公平的。因此,结合供应链治理理论,本文希望通过优化不完整合同条件下的供应链治理策略来最大化供应链的价值。

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  • 来源
    《E3S Web of Conferences》 |2021年第a期|共5页
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    Luyao Wang;

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  • 入库时间 2022-08-19 02:24:39

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