Investigation of Dynamic Incentive of Supply Chain under Information Asymmetry for Screening

摘要

More and more high-end brand companies are exploring new markets by extending low-end product lines. When selecting agents in new markets, a principal often faces the problem of identifying the promotional ability of agents. This paper aims to study the dynamic incentive of supply chain under information asymmetry for the information screening in long-term supply chain cooperation. Also, it pioneers the rhythm of information disclosure in the extant literature. By establishing three two-stage supply chain models, this paper analyzes the impact of agents’ information disclosure speed on the brand. We find that it is better to separate agents earlier out of the brand perspective; the semiseparated contract is beneficial for the brand to control information disclosure speed more flexibly and get more profits from the retailer. But, from the perspective of the supply chain, it is also possible to prefer the mixed contract. Under certain conditions, the pooling contract could also increase the profits of supply chain and improve the allocation efficiency of supply chain.