Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in the Presence of Controlling Shareholders

摘要

Based on agency theory, we focused on the influence of corporate governance in thedividend policy of large listed firms with headquarters in continental Europe countries. Previousresearch focused on the influence of corporate governance on the performance and risk of listedfirms, but the influence of corporate governance on the dividend policy has rarely been addresseddespite the importance of dividends for shareholders and the implications on the free cash-flow,whose application may be a source of conflicts between managers and shareholders. In this paper,we study the influence of a set of governance mechanisms on the dividend policy over 12 years(2002 to 2013). The results, based on a panel data analysis, support the importance of governancemechanisms toward the protection of shareholders’ interests, and reveal that the decisions on whetherto pay dividends and how much to pay are grounded on different antecedents.