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Dividend Policy from the Signaling Perspective and its Effects on Information Asymmetry among Management and Investors

机译:来自信令视角的股息政策及其对管理和投资者信息不对称的影响

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This study attempts to examine the relevance of dividend policy from the signaling perspective and its effects on information asymmetry among management and investors and Compare the relative information content of them. Based on sampling, 88 firms from Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) were selected and examined during 2003 to 2010. The findings show that the dividend policy (Divisible profit proportion) has positive and significant relation with market information asymmetry namely when the dividend policy increases the information asymmetry increases, too. On the other side, the test findings indicate the investors are sensitive to the EPS changes and when the EPS changes are positive their dividend increases, but when the divivend of the company decreases the information boggles their mind and information asymmetry increases. By virtue of the findings it may conclude when EPS and DPS changes are not in the same direction the internal and external information asymmetry of the company increases by changing profit division policy.
机译:本研究试图研究股息政策与信令视角的相关性及其对管理和投资者中信息不对称的影响,并比较它们的相对信息内容。根据抽样,在2003年至2010年期间选择并审查了来自德黑兰证券交易所(TSE)的88家公司。该研究结果表明,当股息政策增加时,股息政策(可分地利润比例)与市场信息不对称有着积极和重要的关系信息不对称也增加。在另一边,测试结果表明投资者对EPS变化敏感,当EPS变化是积极的,当公司的共度减少时,他们的思想和信息不对称地增加了信息。由于结果可以得出结论,当EPS和DPS变化不在同一方向时,公司的内部和外部信息通过不断变化的利润师政策增加了公司的不对称性。

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