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首页> 外文期刊>Global Health Governance: the scholarly journal for the new health security paradigm >Inter-Institutional Relationships in Global Health: Regulating Coordination and Ensuring Accountability
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Inter-Institutional Relationships in Global Health: Regulating Coordination and Ensuring Accountability

机译:全球健康的机构间关系:调节协调和确保问责制

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The global health landscape is characterized by a multitude of actors, including nation states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, all of which play substantial roles in addressing global health issues. The range of organizations involved means a substantial heterogeneity with respect to their structure, mandate, legal standing, and obligations. As well as this diversity, they are substantially differentiated with respect to the power, influence, and the financial resources they are able to mobilize in order to advance their organizational mission. This variety also continues further through to the ability to determine accountability, with each organization differing in the stakeholders to whom it is accountable; some may be accountable to shareholders or a Board of Directors, while others will be accountable to governing bodies, national parliaments, or to the member states which comprise the organization. As such, concepts of accountability are often limited to ensuring accountability for the success of the organizational leadership in achieving the goals related to the mission of the organization1. Thus, the fundamental motivations of organizations are broadly “self-regarding” in nature. This issue, and how this range of actors may be governed in a truly global constitutional system has been considered by a number of scholarly perspectives, resulting in robust, academic discussions on what the global constitutionalized system in global health ought to look like.2 However, one thing which has not yet been addressed fully in the literature, and which adds a distinct layer of complexity in current practice, without this fully formed constitutionalized system, is the fact that, when considering the relationships that organizations have with other relevant actors in the area; the extent to which enforceable obligations are owed between actors is unclear, and it is this which we focused on in the present paper. In this case we are not so much interested in beneficiaries of services provided by organizations, or services which have been formally contracted for between organizations, but rather, what sorts of obligations organizations have towards each other, beyond any contracted services.
机译:全球健康景观的特点是众多的演员,包括国家,国际组织和非政府组织,所有这些都在解决全球卫生问题方面发挥了重大作用。所涉及的组织范围是指与其结构,授权,法律身份和义务的实质性异质性。除了这种多样性,它们与能力,影响力和财务资源有关,他们能够动员,以便提高其组织使命。这种多样性也继续通过对责任来确定问责制的能力,与其负责人的利益攸关方不同;有些可能对股东或董事会负责,而其他人则负责管理机构,国家议会或包括该组织的成员国。因此,问责制的概念通常仅限于确保组织领导成就在实现与组织使命相关的目标方面的责任。因此,组织的基本动机在自然界中广泛地“自我”。这个问题,以及这一系列的行动者可以在真正的全球宪法系统中受到许多学术观点的核准,导致了对全球健康中全球宪政制度的努力的强劲,学术讨论。然而,一件事尚未在文献中完全解决,并且在当前实践中增加了一个不同的复杂性,没有这种完全形成的制度化制度,这是事实上,在考虑组织与其他相关行为的关系时该地区;在演员之间欠所履行的可执行义务的程度尚不清楚,这是我们专注于本文的这一点。在这种情况下,我们对组织提供的服务受益人或在组织之间正式签约的服务的受益者并不是那么多感兴趣,而是,彼此相互履行的义务组织超出任何合同的服务。

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