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Teacher Evaluation and Teacher Turnover in Equilibrium: Evidence From DC Public Schools

机译:均衡的教师评估和教师营业额:来自DC公立学校的证据

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Teacher turnover is an enduring concern in education policy and can incur substantial costs to students. Policies often address turnover broadly, yet effects turn on net differences in the effectiveness of exiting and entering teachers, in addition to the disruption dealt to classrooms. Recent research has shown mixed effects of teacher evaluation policies, but even where evaluation-induced differential turnover initially benefited students, gains might disappear or reverse as the stock of less effective teachers exits and if more effective teachers view high-stakes evaluation as burdensome. We examine evaluation–induced changes to the composition of exiting and entering teachers in Washington, D.C., the net effect of turnover on student achievement, and the role that evaluation played in teacher turnover. We find that turnover continues to improve teaching skills and student achievement, although effects have diminished. We find little evidence that high-performing teachers’ exit is associated with the evaluation system.
机译:教师营业额是教育政策的持久兴趣,可以对学生产生重大成本。政策往往地满足营业额,但除了对课堂的中断外,还对退出和进入教师的有效性的影响。最近的研究表明了教师评估政策的混合影响,但即使在评估引起的差异周转最初受益于学生的情况下,由于较低的教师出口的股票较低的股票,所以提升可能会消失或逆转,如果更有效的教师将高赌注评估视为繁琐。我们研究了在华盛顿,D.C.的出境和进入教师的构成的评估诱导的变化,营业额对学生成就的净效应,以及评估在教师营业额中扮演的作用。我们发现营业额继续提高教学技能和学生成就,尽管有效减少了。我们发现很少的证据表明,高性能教师出口与评估系统有关。

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