Evolution of the Complex Partnerships between Banks and B2B e-Trading Platforms: A Theoretical Interpretation from the Chinese Market

摘要

Based on the principal-agent theory, we give a theoretical interpretation on evolution of the complex partnerships between the online SCF (supply chain finance) providers in China. First, we describe the principal-agent relationships and analyze the optimal profit-sharing contracts between the banks and the B2B platforms. Then, from a dual perspective of leadership transfer and absolute benefit change, we explain the behavioral choices of the banks in the cooperation. Results show that, at the initial stage of growth of the platforms’ abilities to rate online borrowers, the leadership and the absolute benefit of the banks will suffer a “double decline,” which explains why the leading banks in China “divorced” the B2B platforms during 2011 to 2013. However, as the platforms’ rating abilities grow to “maturity,” the absolute benefit of the banks will finally exceed its original level, and then the rational banks would cooperate with the platforms again even at the expense of losing a portion of their leadership, which answers why the banks in China have come back to “remarry” the B2B platforms since 2014.