Supply Chain Coordination with Considering Defective Quality Products Cheaply Processing Under Stochastic Demand Condition

摘要

This paper studies a supply chain coordination problem with a supplier and a manufacturer considering defective products cheaply processing and customer stochastic demand condition based on Stackelberg non-cooperative game theory. We solve the coordination strategies when the manufacturer completely inspects materials of the supplier and the manufacturer cheaply sells the unqualified products resulting from supplier’s raw material quality defects under single period newsboy model and the condition of decentralized, centralized and revenue sharing supply chain separately. We find that we can enlarge the marginal effect when the manufacturer cheaply sells the unqualified productions. When supply chain is coordinated with revenue sharing contract, EOQ, total profit and total risk-sharing of the supply chain are larger than that of non-coordination or decentralized supply chain. The coordinated model of revenue sharing supply chain can achieve the performance of centralized supply chain. The establishment of this coordination will not be affected by changes in wholesale price of supplier. The research can provide some theoretical basis for supply chain to raise internal or external revenue and reduce internal or external risk loss costs.