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A Novel Design Flow for a Security-Driven Synthesis of Side-Channel Hardened Cryptographic Modules

机译:侧通道强化加密模块的安全性驱动综合的新颖设计流程

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Over the last few decades, computer-aided engineering (CAE) tools have been developed and improved in order to ensure a short time-to-market in the chip design business. Up to now, these design tools do not yet support an integrated design strategy for the development of side-channel-resistant hardware implementations. In order to close this gap, a novel framework named AMASIVE (Adaptable Modular Autonomous SIde-Channel Vulnerability Evaluator) was developed. It supports the designer in implementing devices hardened against power attacks by exploiting novel security-driven synthesis methods. The article at hand can be seen as the second of the two contributions that address the AMASIVE framework. While the first one describes how the framework automatically detects vulnerabilities against power attacks, the second one explains how a design can be hardened in an automatic way by means of appropriate countermeasures, which are tailored to the identified weaknesses. In addition to the theoretical introduction of the fundamental concepts, we demonstrate an application to the hardening of a complete hardware implementation of the block cipher PRESENT.
机译:在过去的几十年中,已经开发并改进了计算机辅助工程(CAE)工具,以确保芯片设计业务的上市时间短。到目前为止,这些设计工具尚不支持用于开发抗侧通道硬件实现的集成设计策略。为了弥合这一差距,开发了一种名为AMASIVE(自适应模块化自治SIde通道漏洞评估程序)的新颖框架。它通过利用新颖的安全性驱动综合方法,支持设计人员实施可抵抗功率攻击的设备。可以将本文视为解决AMASIVE框架的两项贡献中的第二篇。第一个描述了框架如何自动检测针对电源攻击的漏洞,而第二个描述了如何通过适当的对策(针对已发现的弱点)通过自动对设计进行加固。除了基本概念的理论介绍之外,我们还演示了一种用于强化分组密码PRESENT的完整硬件实现的应用程序。

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