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Theoretical Annotation of China's National Audit System Change

机译:中国国家审计制度变迁的理论诠释

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Economic interests (economic rationality) and political interests (political rationality) are the dual goals pursued by political state in promoting structural reform. Improving the independence of the national audit as the premise in the national audit system reform, simultaneously not challenging the existing political system, in this paper we construct Pareto Optimality Model with "independence" and "political control ability" as the basic variables and "political state-economic society" as the basic stakeholders with dichotomy, draw Pareto Optimality interval of "political control ability" under the condition of considering transaction costs. Based on stakeholders formed by the national audit system reform in the past 30 years, we further decompose and integrate the stakeholders with dichotomy, and construct a dynamic model of the national audit system reform with the central government, local interest groups and the public as stakeholders, thus to explain theoretically the reform course of national audit system. As fundamental reform in the national audit system that exceeds the constraints of political system and historical tradition is unlikely to occur in a short time, in this paper we put forward promoting the internal optimization of national audit system under the existing political system framework to realize the interaction between good governance of the state and good performance of the national audit.
机译:经济利益(经济合理性)和政治利益(政治合理性)是政治国家在促进结构改革中追求的双重目标。以国家审计体制改革为前提,以提高国家审计体制的独立性为前提,同时不挑战现有的政治体制,本文以“独立性”和“政治控制能力”为基本变量,以“政治性”为基础构建帕累托最优模型。国家经济社会”作为二分法的基本利益相关者,在考虑交易成本的情况下得出“政治控制能力”的帕累托最优区间。在过去30年由国家审计制度改革形成的利益相关者的基础上,我们进一步分解和整合了利益相关者与二分法,并建立了以中央政府,地方利益集团和公众为利益相关者的国家审计制度改革的动态模型从而从理论上解释国家审计制度的改革历程。由于短期内不太可能发生超越政治体制和历史传统约束的国家审计体制的根本性改革,因此,本文提出在现有政治体制框架下促进国家审计体制的内部优化,以实现国家审计体制的内部优化。国家的善政与国家审计的良好绩效之间的相互作用。

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