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Publicity Attached to Reputational Incentives: Anti-corruption Models in the Public Administration

机译:声誉激励附带的宣传:公共管理中的反腐败模式

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This article aims at showing how reputational incentives can be used as a powerful mechanism to address corruption. The method derives from Tirole (2009) relating to the effect of rewards on individuals motivation. The article considers rewards as incentives proposed by the principal in a principal-agent model with information asymmetry related to the agent’s effort. The purpose of this article is to differentiate the types of incentives between monetary ones and reputational ones. We define an additive separable utility function for the agent by distinguishing between the utility related to the monetary incentive and that related to the reputational incentive. And, we determine the indifference curves of the respective utility function and calculate the marginal rates of substitution. The article provides two main results. First, the study indicates that the change in the attractiveness of monetary incentive from an increase in reputational incentive is negative. This result shows a prosocial effect of reputational incentive that reduces the attractiveness of monetary incentive. That shows the powerful impact of reputational mechanisms as incentive that leads to the probity effort of public administration officials. The other result indicates that the change in the attractiveness of reputational incentive from an increase in monetary incentive is negative. This result shows the harmful effect of the monetary incentive that reduces the attractiveness of the reputational incentive and shows that monetary incentives cannot be used to deal with the greed of individuals. These results are reinforced by the positive marginal substitution rates.The article concludes that reputational and publicity mechanisms are powerful motivators that must be taken into account in the design of costless public policies and administration reforms to address corruption of public officials. Furthermore, monetary incentives should not be used as a tool of addressing corruption.
机译:本文旨在展示如何将声誉激励作为解决腐败的有力机制。该方法源自Tirole(2009),涉及奖励对个人动机的影响。本文将奖励视为委托人在委托代理模型中提出的激励措施,该模型具有与代理工作相关的信息不对称性。本文的目的是要区分货币激励和声誉激励的激励类型。通过区分与货币激励相关的效用和与声誉激励相关的效用,我们为代理定义了可加的可分离效用函数。并且,我们确定各个效用函数的无差异曲线,并计算边际替代率。本文提供了两个主要结果。首先,该研究表明,声誉激励的增加会导致货币激励的吸引力变化为负。该结果表明声誉激励的亲社会效应降低了货币激励的吸引力。这表明声誉机制作为激励手段的强大影响,导致公共行政官员的诚信工作。另一个结果表明,声誉激励的吸引力因货币激励的增加而变化为负。该结果表明货币激励的有害影响降低了声誉激励的吸引力,并表明货币激励不能用于应对个人的贪婪。积极的边际替代率进一步强化了这些结果。文章的结论是,声誉和宣传机制是强有力的激励因素,在设计无成本的公共政策和进行行政改革以应对公职人员的腐败时必须考虑这些因素。此外,金钱激励措施不应被用作解决腐败的工具。

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