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Research on Supply Chain Coordination and Profit Allocation Based on Altruistic Principal under Bilateral Asymmetric Information

机译:双边不对称信息下基于利他主体的供应链协调与利益分配研究

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To ensure supply chain coordination and equitable profit allocation when there is bilateral asymmetric information, a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer with private manufacturing cost information and one retailer with private selling cost information is considered. A bilateral adverse selection model is established with a virtual altruistic principal as the coordination subject, for which the supply chain coordination conditions and an allocation rule for the supply chain surplus are then given. It was found that contract coordination depended on the costs and risk rates of both parties and market demand; that is, the lower the costs and the risk rate, the easier the supply chain coordination. Second, the trading volume distortion degree was positively correlated with production cost, sales cost, and price sensitivity and negatively correlated with the market environment parameter. Third, the allocation proportion for the supply chain surplus was determined. Finally, under a specific cost distribution assumption, a numerical example was given to simulate the contract execution and analyze the relationships between costs and profit.
机译:为了确保在存在双边不对称信息的情况下进行供应链协调和公平的利润分配,应考虑由一个拥有私人制造成本信息的制造商和一个拥有私人销售成本信息的零售商组成的供应链。建立了以虚拟利他原则为协调主体的双边逆向选择模型,给出了供应链协调条件和供应链剩余分配规则。发现合同协调取决于双方的成本和风险率以及市场需求。也就是说,成本和风险率越低,供应链的协调就越容易。其次,交易量失真度与生产成本,销售成本和价格敏感性呈正相关,与市场环境参数呈负相关。第三,确定了供应链剩余的分配比例。最后,在特定的成本分配假设下,给出了一个数值示例来模拟合同执行并分析成本与利润之间的关系。

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