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Cybersecurity Analysis of Smart Manufacturing System Using Game Theory Approach and Quantal Response Equilibrium

机译:基于博弈论和量子响应均衡的智能制造系统网络安全分析

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Recently cybersecurity issues have been taken more seriously because of highly increasing integration of industrial internet of things and manufacturing systems. These integrations make smart manufacturing systems more vulnerable to cyber threats. It is widely accepted that risk analysis is a function of (1) likelihood of attacks against an asset and (2) the consequences of such attacks. From a manufacturer’s viewpoint, forecasting behavior of attackers to estimate likelihood of attack is far more difficult, while the second variable is easier to determine based on the system’s configuration. In this paper, cost functions are considered as financial loss to address the consequences of attacks. The game theory approach is utilized to model the rivalry of cyber attackers and the manufacturing systems as the defender. Then, to solve the game, a statistical approach, the quantal response equilibrium (QRE), is applied to find the likelihood of attack and predict the behavior of attackers. The attackers’ behavior is investigated under different circumstances to find the best defensive strategy against expected attacks and analyze the cybersecurity risks in manufacturing systems.
机译:由于工业物联网和制造系统的高度集成,近来网络安全问题已变得更加严重。这些集成使智能制造系统更容易受到网络威胁的攻击。风险分析是(1)攻击资产的可能性和(2)攻击后果的函数,这一点已被广泛接受。从制造商的角度来看,预测攻击者的行为以估计攻击可能性要困难得多,而第二个变量更容易根据系统的配置来确定。在本文中,成本函数被视为解决攻击后果的财务损失。博弈论方法被用来模拟网络攻击者和制造系统作为防御者之间的竞争。然后,为了解决游戏问题,采用了一种统计方法,即量化响应平衡(QRE),以发现攻击的可能性并预测攻击者的行为。在不同情况下对攻击者的行为进行调查,以找到针对预期攻击的最佳防御策略,并分析制造系统中的网络安全风险。

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