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Revenue Maximization in Stackelberg Pricing Games: Beyond the Combinatorial Setting

机译:Stackelberg定价游戏中的收益最大化:超越组合设置

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In a Stackelberg Pricing Game a distinguished player, the leader, chooses prices for a set of items, and the other players, the followers, each seeks to buy a minimum cost feasible subset of the items. The goal of the leader is to maximize her revenue, which is determined by the sold items and their prices. Most previously studied cases of such games can be captured by a combinatorial model where we have a base set of items, some with fixed prices, some priceable, and constraints on the subsets that are feasible for each follower. In this combinatorial setting, Briest et al. and Balcan et al. independently showed that the maximum revenue can be approximated to a factor of H_k ~ log(k), where k is the number of priceable items. Our results are twofold. First, we strongly generalize the model by letting the follower minimize any continuous function plus a linear term over any compact subset of R_(n>=0); the coefficients (or prices) in the linear term are chosen by the leader and determine her revenue. In particular, this includes the fundamental case of linear programs. We give a tight lower bound on the revenue of the leader, generalizing the results of Briest et al. and Balcan et al. Besides, we prove that it is strongly NP-hard to decide whether the optimum revenue exceeds the lower bound by an arbitrarily small factor. Second, we study the parameterized complexity of computing the optimal revenue with respect to the number k of priceable items. In the combinatorial setting, given an efficient algorithm for optimal follower solutions, the maximum revenue can be found by enumerating the 2^k subsets of priceable items and computing optimal prices via a result of Briest et al., giving time O(2^k|I|^c ) where |I| is the input size. Our main result here is a W[1]-hardness proof for the case where the followers minimize a linear program, ruling out running time f(k)|I|^c unless FPT = W[1] and ruling out time |I|^o(k) under the Exponential-Time Hypothesis.
机译:在Stackelberg定价游戏中,杰出的参与者(领导者)为一组商品选择价格,而其他参与者(追随者)则各自寻求购买成本最小的可行商品子集。领导者的目标是最大程度地提高收入,这取决于所售商品及其价格。可以通过组合模型来捕获以前研究过的大多数此类游戏案例,在组合模型中,我们拥有一组基本商品,其中一些商品具有固定价格,一些可定价的商品,并且存在对每个追随者可行的子集约束。在这种组合设置中,Briest等人。和Balcan等。独立显示最大收益可以近似为H_k〜log(k)的因子,其中k是可定价物品的数量。我们的结果是双重的。首先,通过让跟随者最小化R_(n> = 0)的任何紧凑子集上的任何连续函数和线性项,来强烈地推广模型。线性项中的系数(或价格)由领导者选择并确定其收入。特别是,这包括线性程序的基本情况。我们将领导者的收入下限严格,概括了Briest等人的结果。和Balcan等。此外,我们证明,确定最佳收益是否超出任意小因素的下限是NP问题。其次,我们研究了关于可定价物品数量k的最优收益计算的参数化复杂性。在组合设置中,给定有效的最优追随者解决方案算法,可以通过枚举2 ^ k个可定价商品的子集并通过Briest等人的结果计算最优价格来找到最大收益,给定时间O(2 ^ k | I | ^ c)其中| I |是输入大小。对于跟随者最小化线性程序的情况,我们的主要结果是W [1]硬度证明,除非FPT = W [1]否则排除了运行时间f(k)| I | ^ c,而排除了时间| I指数时间假设下的| ^ o(k)。

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