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Emergence of Cooperation as a Non-equilibrium Transition in Noisy Spatial Games

机译:在嘈杂的空间游戏中,合作作为一种非平衡过渡而出现

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The emergence of cooperation among selfish agents that have no incentive to cooperate is a non-trivial phenomenon that has long intrigued biologists, social scientists and physicists. The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game provides a natural framework for investigating this phenomenon. Here, agents repeatedly interact with their opponents, and their choice to either cooperate or defect is determined at each round by knowledge of the previous outcomes. The spatial version of IPD, where each agent interacts only with their nearest neighbors on a specified connection topology, has been used to study the evolution of cooperation under conditions of bounded rationality. In this paper we study how the collective behavior that arises from the simultaneous actions of the agents (implemented by synchronous update) is affected by (i) uncertainty, measured as noise intensity K, (ii) the payoff b, quantifying the temptation to defect and (iii) the nature of the underlying connection topology. In particular, we study the phase transitions between states characterized by distinct collective dynamics as the connection topology is gradually altered from a two-dimensional lattice to a random network. This is achieved by rewiring links between agents with a probability p following the small-world network construction paradigm. On crossing a specified threshold value of b, the game switches from being Prisoner's Dilemma, characterized by a unique equilibrium, to Stag Hunt, a well-known coordination game having multiple equilibria. We observe that the system can exhibit three collective states corresponding to a pair of absorbing states (viz., all agents cooperating or defecting) and a fluctuating state characterized by agents switching intermittently between cooperation and defection. As noise and temptation can be interpreted as temperature and an external field respectively, a strong analogy can be drawn between the phase diagrams of such games with that of interacting spin systems. Considering the 3-dimensional p-K-b parameter space allows us to investigate the different phase transitions that occur between these collective states and characterize them using finite-size scaling. We find that the values of the critical exponents depend on the connection topology and are different from the Directed Percolation (DP) universality class.
机译:自私行为者之间没有合作动机的合作的出现是一个不平凡的现象,长期以来一直困扰着生物学家,社会科学家和物理学家。迭代的囚徒困境(IPD)游戏为调查此现象提供了自然的框架。在这里,特工反复与对手互动,并根据先前的结果在每个回合中决定他们选择合作还是失败。 IPD的空间版本(其中每个代理仅在指定的连接拓扑上仅与其最近的邻居进行交互)已用于研究有限理性条件下合作的演变。在本文中,我们研究了由代理的同步动作(通过同步更新实现)引起的集体行为如何受到以下因素的影响:(i)以噪声强度K度量的不确定性,(ii)收益b,量化缺陷的诱惑(iii)基础连接拓扑的性质。特别是,随着连接拓扑结构从二维晶格逐渐变为随机网络,我们研究了以独特的集体动力学为特征的状态之间的相变。这是通过遵循小世界网络构建范式以概率p重新布线代理之间的链接来实现的。在超过指定的阈值b时,游戏从以独特平衡为特征的“囚徒困境”切换为Stag Hunt,这是众所周知的具有多个平衡的协调游戏。我们观察到,该系统可以表现出与一对吸收状态相对应的三个集体状态(即,所有代理协作或缺损),以及以代理在协作和缺陷之间间歇性切换为特征的波动状态。由于噪声和诱惑可以分别解释为温度和外部磁场,因此可以在此类游戏的相位图与相互作用的自旋系统的相位图之间得出强烈的类比。考虑到3维p-K-b参数空间,我们可以研究在这些集体状态之间发生的不同相变,并使用有限尺寸缩放对其进行表征。我们发现关键指数的值取决于连接拓扑,并且不同于定向渗滤(DP)通用性类。

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