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Communication Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Player Games

机译:两人博弈中相关均衡的沟通复杂性

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摘要

We show a communication complexity lower bound for finding a correlated equilibrium of a two-player game. More precisely, we define a two-player N N game called the 2-cycle game and show that the randomized communication complexity of finding a 1/poly( N )-approximate correlated equilibrium of the 2-cycle game is ( N ) . For small approximation values, this answers an open question of Babichenko and Rubinstein (STOC 2017). Our lower bound is obtained via a direct reduction from the unique set disjointness problem.
机译:我们显示了找到两个玩家游戏的相关均衡时的通信复杂性下限。更准确地说,我们定义了一个称为2周期博弈的两人N N游戏,并证明了找到1 / poly(N)-近似2周期博弈的相关均衡的随机通信复杂度为(N)。对于较小的近似值,这回答了Babichenko和Rubinstein的公开问题(STOC 2017)。我们的下限是通过直接减少唯一集合的不相交问题而获得的。

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