The controversial relationship between neuroscience and moral responsibility in psychopaths

摘要

From fields such as neuroethics and legal medicine it is increasingly common to raise the issue on whether it is necessary to rethink questions such as moral and criminal responsibility in individuals fulfilling Hare’s criteria for psychopathy. The Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist Revised is currently the diagnostic gold standard for psychopathy and defines a type of personality characterized by interpersonal, affective, and behavioral symptoms. Moral and criminal responsibility in these individuals is now being reconsidered due to new data provided by neuroscience. However, the translation from these neuroscientific findings into terms of moral responsibility is neither direct nor evident. The aim of this review is to assemble the available neuroscientific evidence and to clarify the moral consequences of these findings. A genetic base for psychopathy exists as well as brain functionality or even structural variations. However, these structural changes are not robust and consistent across the different studies. Moreover, this body of evidence uses different methodologies and, for this reason, it is hardly comparable. Findings from the field of neuropsychology such as the emotional alterations, empathy impairment or emotional theory of mind (ToM) deviance are equivocal, controversial, and a focus of debate. These can be well understood as correlates of the particular psychopaths’ moral functioning more than as a deterministic causality for their conduct. In addition, a biological and neuropsychological model of moral responsibility open to scientific analysis does not exist. Ultimately, moral responsibility has a biological and neuropsychological basis, but it cannot be fully explained by these constructs. This review assesses new findings in the study of moral and criminal responsibility in psychopaths, and the different interpretations about them. It concludes that, in the absence of an experimental model of moral responsibility, current data, though controversial, are not definitive arguments that can reduce or to eliminate moral, and subsequently, criminal responsibility.