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Does a Least-Preferred Candidate Win a Seat? A Comparison of Three Electoral Systems

机译:最少的候选人能赢得席位吗?三种选举制度的比较

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In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferredcandidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR.
机译:在本文中,从比例代表制(PR)的两个变体(公开名单PR和封闭名单PR)之间的差异分析了它们准确反映选民偏好的能力。比较中还包含单个不可转让的投票(SNTV),作为基准。我们构建了一个具有选举人最不喜欢的候选人的投票均衡模型,这意味着将获胜者集中的最不喜欢的候选人替换为任何失败者都是帕累托的改进,而我们的重点是在以下情况下最不喜欢的候选人是否获胜每个选举制度。我们证明,最受偏爱的候选人永远不会在SNTV下获胜,但可以在公开名单PR中获胜,尽管这比在不公开名单PR中获胜的可能性小。

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