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Disagreement in expectations and the credibility of monetary authorities in the Brazilian inflation targeting regime

机译:在巴西的通胀目标制中,期望值和货币当局的信誉存在分歧

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Based on market expectations reported by the Central Bank of Brazil for the SELIC interest rate, the IPCA inflation, the exchange rate (BRL/USD) and the growth rate of industrial production for four different forecasting horizons, this work analyzes the term structures of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of these variables. It also investigates the driving factors of disagreement, paying special attention to the influence of monetary authorities’ credibility. An extensive regression analysis shows that the levels of the term structures of disagreement are negatively related to the output gap (although this result is not very robust); and that the levels of the term structures of disagreement in expectations about the IPCA inflation rate and the SELIC interest rate have a strong negative relationship with central bankers’ credibility; this relationship is positive in the case of the growth rate of industrial production.
机译:根据巴西中央银行对SELIC利率,IPCA通胀,汇率(BRL / USD)和工业生产增长率的四种不同预测水平的市场预期,本工作分析了分歧的期限结构对这些变量的未来价值有期望。它还研究了分歧的驱动因素,并特别关注了货币当局信誉的影响。广泛的回归分析表明,不同意见的期限结构水平与产出缺口负相关(尽管这个结果不是很可靠);而且,对于IPCA通货膨胀率和SELIC利率的期望存在分歧的期限结构水平与中央银行的信誉有着强烈的消极关系;对于工业生产的增长率,这种关系是正的。

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