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Taxation, credit constraints and the informal economy

机译:税收,信贷约束与非正规经济

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This paper extends Evans and Jovanovic (1989)'s entrepreneurship model to incorporate the informal sector. Specifically, entrepreneurs can operate either in the formal sector – in which they have limited access to credit markets and must pay taxes – or in the informal sector – in which they can avoid paying taxes, but have no access to credit markets. In addition, technology in the informal sector is both less productive and more labor intensive than that in the formal sector. We calibrate the model to the Brazilian economy, and evaluate the impact of credit frictions and taxation on occupational choices, aggregate output and inequality. Removing all distortions can improve aggregate efficiency considerably, largely because this induces entrepreneurs to switch to the formal sector, where the technology is superior. Most of this effect comes from removing credit market frictions, but taxes on formal businesses are also important. The elimination of distortions can also reduce income inequality substantially.
机译:本文扩展了Evans和Jovanovic(1989)的企业家模型,以纳入非正规部门。具体来说,企业家既可以在正规部门(他们进入信贷市场的机会有限,必须纳税)经营,也可以在非正规部门(可以避免纳税,但无法进入信贷市场)经营。此外,与正规部门相比,非正规部门的技术生产率较低,劳动强度更高。我们根据巴西经济对模型进行了校准,并评估了信贷摩擦和税收对职业选择,总产出和不平等的影响。消除所有失真可以大大提高总体效率,这主要是因为这促使企业家转向技术领先的正规部门。这种影响大部分来自消除信贷市场的摩擦,但是对正规企业征税也很重要。消除扭曲也可以大大减少收入不平等。

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