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The Analysis About Vertical Differentiation, Cost Structure and the Stability of Collusion

机译:垂直分异,成本结构和合谋稳定性分析

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In order to analyze collusion stability in real economy under different cost structure, the fixed cost structure and variable cost structure is assumed under vertical differentiation and different competitive types (Cournot competition and Bertrand competition). By comparing the different competitive equilibrium, firm competes with each other under different cost structure and competitive types, which influences the stability of collusion in different ways. Under fixed cost and changeable cost structure, the high-quality firm is always more difficult to maintain collusion than the low-quality firm in vertical differentiation. With the increase of, the quality difference will get smaller and smaller, the high-quality becomes more and more difficult to maintain collusion. In equilibrium, price competition is fiercer, firms aim to release price competition under Bertrand competition, and so the quality difference will be bigger.
机译:为了分析不同成本结构下实体经济中的合谋稳定性,在垂直分化和不同竞争类型(古诺竞争和贝特朗竞争)下,假设固定成本结构和可变成本结构为假设。通过比较不同的竞争均衡,企业在不同的成本结构和竞争类型下相互竞争,从而以不同的方式影响合谋的稳定性。在固定成本和可变成本结构下,在垂直分化方面,优质企业总是比低质企业更难以维持合谋。随着的增加,质量差异将越来越小,高质量的勾结变得越来越困难。在均衡状态下,价格竞争更加激烈,企业希望在Bertrand竞争下释放价格竞争,因此质量差异会更大。

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