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Dual-channel Supply Chain Coordination with New Buy-back Contract Based on Fairness Preference Theory

机译:基于公平偏好理论的新购回合同双渠道供应链协调

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In the general case of the non linear stochastic demand affected by the sales effort of the retailer, the fairness preference theory was applied to constructing Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer. The manufacturer is self-interested, the retailer has a fairness preference. This study designs a new buy-back contract coordinating the dual-channel supply chain, the value of every parameter for the new buy-back contract which can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain, is achieved respectively. At last, the related digital simulation and example analysis were presented for the purpose of proofing the model theoretical analysis conclusions. Whether the retailer concerns fairness or not, the results show that coordination will always reach balance as long as the value of contract parameters meet certain conditions, the retailer?s fairness preference does not affect the supply chain coordination conditions. However, the retailer?s fairness preference will generates much negative utility to itself and the whole supply chain, the greater the level of fairness preference, the bigger the negative utility.
机译:在非线性随机需求受零售商的销售努力影响的一般情况下,将公平偏好理论应用于制造商和零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈模型的构建。制造商是自私的,零售商有公平的偏爱。本研究设计了一种协调双渠道供应链的新回购合同,分别实现了可以协调双渠道供应链的新回购合同的各个参数值​​。最后,给出了相关的数字仿真和实例分析,以证明模型的理论分析结论。无论零售商是否关注公平性,结果都表明,只要合同参数的值满足特定条件,协调就会始终达到平衡,零售商的公平偏好不会影响供应链协调条件。但是,零售商的公平偏好将对其自身和整个供应链产生很大的负面效用,公平偏好的水平越高,负面效用就越大。

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