Privacy-Aware Information Sharing in Location-Based Services: Attacks and Defense

摘要

Location-based services (LBSs) are useful for many applications in internet of things(IoT). However, LBSs has raised serious concerns about users' location privacy. In this paper, we propose a new location privacy attack in LBSs called hidden location inference attack, in which the adversary infers users' hidden locations based on the users' check-in histories. We discover three factors that influence individual check-in behaviors: geographic information, human mobility patterns and user preferences. We first separately evaluate the effects of each of these three factors on users' check-in behaviors. Next, we propose a novel algorithm that integrates the above heterogeneous factors and captures the probability of hidden location privacy leakage. Then, we design a novel privacy alert framework to warn users when their sharing behavior does not match their sharing rules. Finally, we use our experimental results to demonstrate the validity and practicality of the proposed strategy.