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首页> 外文期刊>Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition >THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE ROLE OF CHAIRMAN AND CEO IN PORTUGAL
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THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE ROLE OF CHAIRMAN AND CEO IN PORTUGAL

机译:所有制结构对企业绩效的影响:董事长兼首席执行官在葡萄牙的作用

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摘要

This analysis investigates how family ownership structure affects the corporate performance of Portuguese listed firms using a panel data set covering the period from 2006 to 2014. Three characteristics of family firms (such as active management, active founder or heir and second blockholder) were examined with respect to the corporate performance. The main finding is that family firms over perform non-family in term productivity and profitability. This indicates that companies that have total family control are more productive and profitable than those market favour firms that the family does not have total ownership. Specifically, family firms with active founders perform better whereas those with active heirs significantly outperform compared to family firms with passive owners or heirs. Family firms with a family member in the company as either CEO or Chairman create more value and are more profitable than non-family firms. Family firms with descendant as CEO perform better meanwhile family firms with the founder as CEO significantly outperform family firms with Outside CEO for corporate performance. Lastly, the presence of a second blockholder who owns between 5-10% of the voting right enhances the corporate performance of the family firms as it counterbalances the controlling shareholder from unnecessary behaviours.
机译:该分析使用覆盖2006年至2014年的面板数据集,研究了家族所有制结构如何影响葡萄牙上市公司的企业绩效。家族企业的三个特征(例如,积极管理,积极创始人或继承人以及第二大股东)与尊重公司绩效。主要发现是,家族企业在长期生产率和盈利能力方面表现不佳。这表明,拥有全部家族控制权的公司比那些家族没有完全所有权的市场青睐的公司更具生产力和利润。具体来说,拥有主动创始人的家族企业的业绩要好于拥有活跃继承人的家族企业,其表现要优于拥有被动所有者或继承人的家族企业。与非家族企业相比,家族企业中有家族成员担任首席执行官或董事长的家族企业可以创造更多的价值,并且利润更高。以后代为首席执行官的家族企业的业绩要好一些,而以创始人为首席执行官的家族企业的公司绩效要明显优于由外部首席执行官担任的家族企业。最后,拥有5-10%投票权的第二大股东的存在提高了家族企业的公司绩效,因为它平衡了控股股东的不必要行为。

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