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High cost enhances cooperation through the interplay between evolution and self-organisation

机译:高成本通过进化与自组织之间的相互作用增强了合作

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Cooperation is ubiquitous in biological systems, yet its evolution is a long lasting evolutionary problem. A general and intuitive result from theoretical models of cooperative behaviour is that cooperation decreases when its costs are higher, because selfish individuals gain selective advantage. Contrary to this intuition, we show that cooperation can increase with higher costs. We analyse a minimal model where individuals live on a lattice and evolve the degree of cooperation. We find that a feedback establishes between the evolutionary dynamics of public good production and the spatial self-organisation of the population. The evolutionary dynamics lead to the speciation of a cooperative and a selfish lineage. The ensuing spatial self-organisation automatically diversifies the selection pressure on the two lineages. This enables selfish individuals to successfully invade cooperators at the expenses of their autonomous replication, and cooperators to increase public good production while expanding in the empty space left behind by cheaters. We show that this emergent feedback leads to higher degrees of cooperation when costs are higher. An emergent feedback between evolution and self-organisation leads to high degrees of cooperation at high costs, under simple and general conditions. We propose this as a general explanation for the evolution of cooperative behaviours under seemingly prohibitive conditions.
机译:合作在生物系统中无处不在,但是它的演变是一个长期的进化问题。合作行为理论模型的一个普遍而直观的结果是,当合作成本较高时,合作就会减少,因为自私的个人会获得选择优势。与这种直觉相反,我们表明合作可以增加成本。我们分析了一个最小模型,其中个体生活在一个格子上并发展合作程度。我们发现,在公共产品生产的演化动态与人口的空间自组织之间建立了反馈。进化动力学导致合作和自私的血统形成。随之而来的空间自组织会自动分散两个血统的选择压力。这使自私的个人能够以他们的自主复制为代价而成功地入侵合作者,并且使合作者增加公共物品的产量,同时在作弊者留下的空白处扩大。我们表明,当成本较高时,这种紧急反馈会导致更高程度的合作。在简单和普遍的条件下,进化与自我组织之间的紧急反馈会导致高成本下的高度合作。我们提议将其作为看似禁止的条件下合作行为演变的一般解释。

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