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Solving a class of modular polynomial equations and its relation to modular inversion hidden number problem and inversive congruential generator

机译:求解一类模块化多项式方程及其与模块化反演隐数问题和逆同余生成器的关系

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In this paper we revisit the modular inversion hidden number problem (MIHNP) and the inversive congruential generator (ICG) and consider how to attack them more efficiently. We consider systems of modular polynomial equations of the form and show the relation between solving such equations and attacking MIHNP and ICG. We present three heuristic strategies using Coppersmith's lattice-based root-finding technique for solving the above modular equations. In the first strategy, we use the polynomial number of samples and get the same asymptotic bound on attacking ICG proposed in PKC 2012, which is the best result so far. However, exponential number of samples is required in the work of PKC 2012. In the second strategy, a part of polynomials chosen for the involved lattice are linear combinations of some polynomials and this enables us to achieve a larger upper bound for the desired root. Corresponding to the analysis of MIHNP we give an explicit lattice construction of the second attack method proposed by Boneh, Halevi and Howgrave-Graham in Asiacrypt 2001. We provide better bound than that in the work of PKC 2012 for attacking ICG. Moreover, we propose the third strategy in order to give a further improvement in the involved lattice construction in the sense of requiring fewer samples.
机译:在本文中,我们将重新探讨模块化反演隐藏数问题(MIHNP)和逆同余生成器(ICG),并考虑如何更有效地对其进行攻击。我们考虑形式为模块化的多项式方程组,并显示求解此类方程与攻击MIHNP和ICG之间的关系。我们提出了三种使用铜匠基于晶格的寻根技术来求解上述模块化方程的启发式策略。在第一种策略中,我们使用样本的多项式数量,并在PKC 2012中提出的攻击ICG上得到相同的渐近界线,这是迄今为止最好的结果。但是,在PKC 2012的工作中需要指数数量的样本。在第二种策略中,为涉及的晶格选择的多项式的一部分是某些多项式的线性组合,这使我们能够为所需的根获得更大的上限。相应于对MIHNP的分析,我们给出了Boneh,Halevi和Howgrave-Graham在Asiacrypt 2001中提出的第二种攻击方法的明确格构结构。与PKC 2012的工作相比,我们提供了更好的约束来攻击ICG。此外,我们提出了第三种策略,以从需要更少样本的意义上进一步改善所涉及的晶格结构。

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