Undermining cooperation: donor-patrons and the failure of political conditionality

摘要

This study extends the debate concerning the feasibility of using foreign assistance to leverage political reforms in developing countries. This research combines both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in an effort to expand on the work done by previous scholars. Conclusions of the empirical analysis point to the finding that political conditionality is most effective when close cooperation exists between donors. This coordination, however, is frequently sabotaged by self-interested donor-patrons, illustrated by the case of Cameroon and France. This pattern is generalizable and significantly undermines the overall success rate of a political conditionality approach.View full textDownload full textKeywordspolitical conditionality, donor-patrons, foreign aid, donor coordination, Cameroon, FranceRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2010.501174