A Game Theory View of Military Conflict in the Taiwan Strait

摘要

A "Confident" China is unambiguously peaceful. A China that is "Patient" or "Impatient" tends to be belligerent, but can be deterred through investments that assure US access to the Taiwan Strait (overcoming access denial activities) and robust defenses on Taiwan. As one might expect, it is more difficult to deter an Impatient than a Patient China. In this game theoretic framework, a Patient China can be deterred unless an invasion is likely to be highly successful. However, an Impatient China would launch an invasion even if it is likely to be only partially successful. An Impatient China with significant access denial capabilities is especially difficult to deter. A "Desperate" PRC is very warlike and otherwise unpleasant to live with. The most likely result is invasion followed by forced reunification, unless Taiwan is able to repel the invasion without outside intervention. (This is our worst case scenario.) For the US, the PRC's Access Denial capabilities (raising the cost of engaging in the Taiwan Strait area) matters more than the PRC's Access Deterrence threats to the US homeland. There is no difference in results for large US NMD vs. small NMD. Among other tilings, this suggests the possibility that resources committed to Confidence Building Measures (CBM) that lead to a Confident China might substitute for National Missile Defense (NMD) investments. In contrast, capabilities for contesting US access on a sustained basis make the Blockade result more costly for the US. If, as we have assumed, strongly contested access makes "Forced Reunification" better than "Blockade" in US preferences, results of any confrontation can change significantly.