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A matter of reevaluation: Incentivizing users to contribute reviews in online platforms

机译:重新评估的问题:激励用户在在线平台上发表评论

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摘要

Content sharing platforms such as product review websites largely depend on reviewers' voluntary contributions. In order to motivate reviewers to contribute more, many platforms established incentive mechanisms, either reputation-based or financial. Yet most of the existing research has focused on reputations that are everlasting, such as badges and virtual points, or financial rewards where no evaluation exists about the users' contributed content, such as rebates. There is still a significant gap in our understanding of how incentives with reevaluation mechanism actually influence reviewers' behaviors such as their contribution levels, the opinion they express, and how they express. In this paper, we fill this gap using data collected from Yelp Elite Squad where reviewers with good reviewing history are awarded into the elite group and most importantly reevaluated each year. We draw from the accountability theory and conduct a difference-in-differences analysis to empirically study the effect of incentives with reevaluation mechanism on reviewers' behaviors in both short term and long term. The results show that in short term, reviewers significantly increase their contribution levels, become more conservative with lower percentage of extreme ratings, and also increase the readability of their reviews. In long term, they continue improving the quality of reviews though their numerical rating behaviors stabilize. Our research has significant implications for business models that rely on user contributions.
机译:诸如产品评论网站之类的内容共享平台在很大程度上取决于评论者的自愿捐款。为了激励评论者做出更多贡献,许多平台建立了基于声誉或财务的激励机制。然而,现有的大多数研究都集中在永久性的声誉上,例如徽章和虚拟积分,或者没有对用户贡献内容进行评估的经济奖励(例如回扣)。关于重新评估机制的激励措施实际上如何影响审稿人的行为(例如他们的贡献水平,他们表达的意见以及他们如何表达)的理解,我们之间仍然存在很大差距。在本文中,我们使用从Yelp精英小组收集的数据来填补这一空白,在该小组中,具有良好审查历史的审查者被授予精英小组,并且最重要的是每年进行重新评估。我们从问责制理论出发,进行差异分析,以实证研究具有重新评估机制的激励机制对短期和长期行为对审稿人行为的影响。结果表明,在短期内,审稿人会显着提高他们的贡献水平,在极端评分的百分比降低的情况下变得更加保守,并提高审稿的可读性。从长远来看,尽管他们的数字评分行为稳定,他们仍继续提高评论的质量。我们的研究对依赖用户贡献的业务模型具有重大意义。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Decision support systems》 |2020年第1期|113158.1-113158.12|共12页
  • 作者单位

    Shanghai Int Studies Univ Sch Business & Management Shanghai 201620 Peoples R China;

    Univ Arizona Eller Coll Management Tucson AZ 85721 USA|Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ Antai Coll Econ & Management Shanghai 200030 Peoples R China;

    Chinese Acad Sci Inst Automat Beijing 100864 Peoples R China|Shenzhen Artificial Intelligence & Data Sci Inst Shenzhen 518129 Guangdong Peoples R China;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《工程索引》(EI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Reevaluation mechanism; Incentives; Accountability; Product reviews;

    机译:重新评估机制;激励措施;问责制;产品评论;

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