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Islamic Ethics and the Controversy about the Moral Heart of Confucianism

机译:伊斯兰伦理与儒家道德之心之争

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This essay briefly evaluates the ongoing controversy between LIU Qingping and GUOnQiyong (and their followers) about the “moral heart” of Confucianism in order to draw ancomparison with Islamic ethics for mutual illumination of the two traditions (see Guo 2007:n21). Liu argues that Confucianism is basically consanguinism and, as such, it lands into ann“embarrassing paradox” in its moral thinking when dealing with conflicts between filialnpiety and brotherly love on the one hand and public good on the other. It also lands in an“profound paradox” when it comes to extending family love to humanity in general becausensuch extension is impossible without a universalistic human love (Liu 2007). Guo contestsnthis view and insists that the root of morality in Confucianism is not family love but ourn“moral heart/mind,” endowed by “Heaven” with universal human love. Filial piety is onlynthe “root of practice” of this universal human love and not the root of all morality.nTherefore, Confucianism has all the resources for a universalistic ethics and it is “thennatural order” of the practice of human love to start with parental and brotherly love (Guon2007). This controversy revolves particularly around Analects 13.18, where Confucius talksnabout fathers and sons covering up for each other, and Mencius 7A35 and 5A3, wherenMencius talks about King Shun leaving his empire and running away to help his fathernescape punishment for murder (7A35) and giving princely status to his murderous brothern(5A3). Liu challenges Mencius’s presentation of Shun as a great hero, sage-king, ofnConfucian tradition because these cases point toward public corruption by Shun in the namenof filial piety and brotherly love. Guo, however, defends Mencius’s position as underliningnthe need, per traditional Confucian culture, for “grace” rather than “righteousness” in thenprivate sphere of life, and also as protecting family love as the “root of practice” fornuniversal human love. These two opposing interpretations can be pictured as follows:*There is a natural order of flow (of water, so to speak) from the source/root to the first pool and onwards.nAlso there is a moral priority and superiority belonging to each preceding column (Guo 2007: 28, 29).n**Parents and relatives need not be criticized frankly for minor faults. They need not be followed blindlyneither and can be remonstrated only pleasantly. While righteousness rules the public domain, in privatenmatters involving relatives, one has to follow grace (Guo 2007: 26).
机译:本文简要评估了刘庆平和郭其庸(及其追随者)之间关于儒家“道德之心”的持续争议,以便与伊斯兰教义进行比较以相互阐明这两种传统(见郭2007:n21)。刘认为,儒学本质上是血缘主义,因此,在处理孝顺与兄弟之爱之间以及另一方面与公共利益之间的冲突时,其道德思想陷入了“尴尬的悖论”。当把家庭之爱扩展到人类时,它也陷入了一个“深刻的悖论”中,因为没有普遍的人类之爱,这种扩展是不可能的(Liu 2007)。郭反对这种观点,坚持认为儒家道德的根源不是家庭之爱,而是我们“道德之心/思想”,这是“天堂”赋予人类普遍的爱。孝道只是这种普遍的人类爱的“实践根源”,而不是所有道德的根源。因此,儒家拥有一切普遍伦理的资源,从父母亲开始,这是人类爱的实践的“自然顺序”。和兄弟般的爱(Guon2007)。这场争论尤其围绕《论语》 13.18进行,孔子谈论父子互相掩盖,孟子7A35和5A3则在孟子谈论舜王离开他的帝国并逃离以帮助谋杀他的父亲而逃脱惩罚(7A35)并给予王子杀害他的兄弟(5A3)。刘对孟子提出的舜是儒家传统的圣贤大王提出了挑战,因为这些案件表明舜以孝顺和兄弟之爱的名义进行了公共腐败。但是,郭明defend为孟子的立场辩护,认为孟子传统的儒家文化强调了当时私生活中对“恩典”而非“公义”的需求,并强调保护家庭之爱是人类普遍的爱的“实践根源”。这两种相反的解释可以描述如下:*从源头/根源到第一个池以及以后的池中有自然的流动顺序(可以说是水)。专栏(Guo 2007:28,29)。n**不必为父母和亲戚的小失大坦白。他们也不必盲目跟随,只能令人愉快地证明。正义统治着公共领域,但在涉及亲戚的私人场合中,人们必须遵循恩典(Guo 2007:26)。

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