Packages of judicial independence: implications for reform proposals on the selection & tenure of Article III judges

摘要

The U.S. Supreme Court justices, and the judges who serve in the federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals, are all Article III judges, appointed and holding office pursuant to Article III of the Constitution.2 Nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, Article III judges hold office "during good Behaviour" and their salary cannot be reduced once in office. The selection and tenure rules for Article III judges affect both the decisional independence of individual judges and the institutional independence of the judiciary as a whole.n Even though it would be easy at times of intense conflict and polarization for those "engaged in the struggle to see it as an apocalyptic confrontation between good and evil, when customary restraints must be cast off," Rehnquist wrote, enough Senators maintained their loyalty to the Constitution, over narrow partisan interest, to help secure judicial independence through their vote to acquit.52 At a time when more of the world's countries are moving to a system of independent courts for constitutional review, it would be quite a step for the United States which contributed the idea of judicial review by independent courts to the world - to move away from it.