Are optimal contracting and managerial power competing or complementary views? Evidence from the compensation of statutory auditors in Italy

Melis Andrea; Rombi Luigi

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Are optimal contracting and managerial power competing or complementary views? Evidence from the compensation of statutory auditors in Italy

机译：最佳签约和管理权是相互竞争的观点还是互补的观点？来自意大利法定审计师报酬的证据

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Manuscript TypeEmpirical

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来源
《Corporate Governance》 |2018年第3期|197-218|共22页
作者
Melis Andrea; Rombi Luigi;
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作者单位

Univ Cagliari, Dept Business & Econ, Cagliari, Italy;

Univ Cagliari, Dept Business & Econ, Cagliari, Italy;

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原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
中图分类
关键词
Corporate Governance Theories; Board of Director Mechanisms; Director Compensation; Italy; Agency Theory;

机译：公司治理理论;董事会机制;董事薪酬;意大利;代理理论;

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Are optimal contracting and managerial power competing or complementary views? Evidence from the compensation of statutory auditors in Italy

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