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Moderating role of CEO compensation in lean innovation strategies of Chinese listed family firms

机译:首席执行官赔偿在中国上市家庭公司精益创新策略中的调节作用

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Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of Chinese listed family firms on lean innovation strategies. Additionally, the authors also examined the moderating role of CEO compensation on the family ownership and lean innovation strategies relationship. Design/methodology/approach - Data is obtained from CSMAR database about Chinese family firms listed at Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange. Panel data comprising of firm year observations from 2007 to 2016 is analyzed using STATA. Findings - Family firms are proactive towards research and development investment (innovation input) as well as towards patent applications (innovation output). Moreover, family firms show propensity towards patent applications and towards converting their R&D investment into granted patent applications. CEO compensation negatively moderates the nexus between family firms and lean innovation which seriously needs to be addressed to reduce agency costs. Research limitations/implications - The study has focused on Chinese market only. The study is useful for policy makers to address the serious concerns identified in the conclusion section, i.e. effectiveness of CEO compensation in addressing the lean innovation strategies in emerging economy like that of China. Originality/value - Given the usually considered conservative approach of family firms towards innovation, this is the first study which has tested the moderating role of CEO compensation on family firms and lean innovation relationship in an emerging economy. This study is unique because it provides a detailed analysis of lean innovation process by splitting the process into different stages. The negative moderating impact of CEO compensation raises new concerns to resolve agency conflicts.
机译:目的 - 本文的目的是审查中国上市家庭公司对精益创新策略的影响。此外,作者还审查了首席执行官赔偿对家庭所有权和精益创新战略关系的调节作用。设计/方法/方法 - 从CSMAR数据库获得关于深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所中市的中国家庭公司的数据库。使用STATA分析包括2007年至2016年的公司年度观测的面板数据。调查结果 - 家庭公司积极主动地研究和开发投资(创新投入)以及专利申请(创新产出)。此外,家庭公司向专利申请表现出对专利申请的倾向,并将其研发投资转化为授予的专利申请。首席执行官薪酬对家庭企业和精益创新之间的Nexus负调节,这严重需要解决,以降低代理成本。研究限制/影响 - 该研究仅关注中国市场。该研究对于政策制定者有助于解决结论部分中确定的严重问题,即首席执行官赔偿在中国新兴经济中的精益创新策略中的有效性。原创性/价值 - 鉴于通常认为家庭企业的保守方法对创新,这是第一项研究,该研究已经测试了首席执行官赔偿对家庭企业和精益创新关系在新兴经济中的调节作用。本研究是独一无二的,因为它通过将过程分成不同阶段来提供精益创新过程的详细分析。首席执行官赔偿的负面调节影响提高了解决机构冲突的新担忧。

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