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Buffer space hedging enabled production time variation coordination in prefabricated construction

机译:缓冲空间套期保值可在预制结构中协调生产时间变化

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摘要

In this paper, an on-site production time variation coordination is studied between a general contractor and a building contractor. To entice the building contractor to reduce its production time variation, which improves system performance but adds more pressure to the building contractor, a buffer space hedging (BSH) method is offered by the general contractor. The BSH is to reserve more spare space at an intermediate warehouse and serves for contingency usage. It can be an incentive for the building contractor because he is always confronted with site congestion, which is the major causes of serious project time and cost overrun. Four decision scenarios are investigated and compared: (1) an on-site production time variation reduction (OPTVR) coordination model; (2) a BSH coordination model; (3) a Nash game model denoting an equal bargaining power setting; and (4) a building contractor led Stackelberg game model. Closed-form expressions of the optimal OPTVR amount, the BSH amount, and the profit-sharing rate are derived. Comparative analysis reveals that the proposed game mechanisms can mitigate the pressure caused by adopting the OPTVR. Numerical studies further demonstrate that a win-win outcome is reached in two game models. Especially, the Nash game outperforms the Stackelberg game, and the building contractor benefits more from the mechanism than the general contractor.
机译:本文研究了总承包商与建筑承包商之间的现场生产时间变化协调。为了吸引建筑承包商减少其生产时间变化,从而改善系统性能,但给建筑承包商增加压力,总承包商提供了一种缓冲空间套期保值(BSH)方法。 BSH将在中间仓库中保留更多备用空间,以备不时之需。这可能是对建筑承包商的一种激励,因为他总是面临着场地拥挤的问题,这是严重的项目时间和成本超支的主要原因。研究并比较了四个决策方案:(1)现场生产时间变化减少(OPTVR)协调模型; (2)BSH协调模型; (3)表示相等议价能力设定的Nash游戏模型; (4)由建筑承包商领导的Stackelberg游戏模型。得出最优OPTVR量,BSH量和利润分享率的闭式表达式。比较分析表明,所提出的博弈机制可以缓解采用OPTVR带来的压力。数值研究进一步表明,在两种博弈模型中都达到了双赢的结果。特别是,纳什(Nash)游戏胜过斯塔克尔伯格(Stackelberg)游戏,建筑承包商比一般承包商从该机制中受益更多。

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