...
首页> 外文期刊>IEEE Transactions on Computers >Instruction Sequence Identification and Disassembly Using Power Supply Side-Channel Analysis
【24h】

Instruction Sequence Identification and Disassembly Using Power Supply Side-Channel Analysis

机译:使用电源侧通道分析指令序列识别和拆卸

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
   

获取外文期刊封面封底 >>

       

摘要

Embedded systems are prone to leak information via side-channels associated with their physical internal activity, such as power consumption, timing, and faults. Leaked information can be analyzed to extract sensitive data and devices should be assessed for such vulnerabilities. Side-channel power-supply leakage from embedded devices can also provide information regarding instruction-level activity for control code executed on these devices. Methods proposed to disassemble instruction-level activity via side-channel leakage have not addressed issues related to pipelined multi-clock-cycle architectures, nor have proven robustness or reliability. The problem of detecting malicious code modifications while not obstructing the sequence of instructions being executed needs to be addressed. In this article, instruction sequences being executed on a general-purpose pipelined computing platform are identified and instructions that make up these sequences are classified based on hardware utilization. Individual instruction classification results using a fine-grained classifier is also presented. A dynamic programming algorithm was applied to detect the boundaries of instructions in a sequence with a 100 percent accuracy. A unique aspect of this technique is the use of multiple power supply pin measurements to increase precision and accuracy. To demonstrate the robustness of this technique, power leakage data from ten target FPGAs programmed with a prototype of the pipelined architecture was analyzed and classification accuracies averaging 99 percent were achieved with instructions labeled based on hardware utilization. Individual instruction classification accuracies above 90 percent were achieved using a fine-grained classifier. Classification accuracies were also verified when a target FPGA was subjected to different controlled temperatures. The classification accuracies on discrete (ASIC) pipelined-architecture microcontrollers was 97 percent.
机译:嵌入式系统容易通过与其物理内部活动相关的侧通道泄漏信息,例如功耗,定时和故障。可以分析泄漏的信息以提取敏感数据,应评估这些漏洞的设备。嵌入式设备的侧通道电源泄漏还可以提供关于在这些设备上执行的控制代码的指令级活动的信息。通过侧通道泄漏拆卸指令级活动的方法尚未解决与流水线多时钟周期架构相关的问题,也没有证明鲁棒性或可靠性。检测恶意代码修改的问题,同时不需要解决正在执行的指令序列。在本文中,识别在通用流水线计算平台上执行的指令序列,并基于硬件利用率对构成这些序列的指令进行分类。还呈现了使用细粒度分类器的单个指令分类结果。应用动态编程算法以检测具有100%精度的序列中指令的边界。该技术的独特方面是使用多电源引脚测量来提高精度和精度。为了证明这种技术的稳健性,分析了具有流水线架构的原型的10个目标FPGA的电力泄漏数据,并通过基于硬件利用率标记的指令来实现平均99%的分类精度。使用细粒度分类器实现了90%以上的个体指令分类精度。当靶FPGA受到不同受控温度时,还验证了分类精度。离散(ASIC)流水线 - 架构微控制器上的分类精度为97%。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号