首页> 外文期刊>Computer law & security report >Governmental filtering of websites: The Dutch case
【24h】

Governmental filtering of websites: The Dutch case

机译:政府对网站的过滤:荷兰案例

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

Following the example of Norway and other European Countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, in April 2007 the Dutch government started filtering and blocking web pages with child pornographic content. In this paper we present a research into the technological, legal and practical possibilities of this measure. Our study leads us to the conclusion that the deployment of filters by or on behalf of the Dutch government is not based on any founded knowledge concerning the effectiveness of the approach. Furthermore, the actions of the Dutch law enforcement authorities do not avail over legal powers to filter and block internet traffic. Consequently the Dutch filtering practice was found to be unlawful. The government could enact a law that provides the police with the relevant powers. However, child porn filters always cause a certain amount of structural over-blocking, which means that the government is then engaged in structural blocking of information that is not against the law. This would be in conflict with basic rights as laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in national legislation. Maintaining a blacklist that is serious in size (a necessary condition for being effective), and at the same time is up-to-date and error-free (which is needed to prevent overblocking), is very labour-intensive, if not impossible to maintain. From the Dutch national police policy perspective it follows that putting so much labour in maintaining a blacklist cannot be considered as a police task. Why then did the Dutch police start filtering? In a society where child pornography is judged with abhorrence, in which safety is rated higher then privacy, and in which managers and politicians frequently have a naive faith in technology, the advocates of internet filters against child pornography quickly find wide-spread support. Although this paper refers to the situation in The Netherlands, it includes a number of elements and issues that are relevant to other European States as well.
机译:以挪威和瑞典和丹麦等其他欧洲国家为例,荷兰政府于2007年4月开始过滤和阻止带有儿童色情内容的网页。在本文中,我们对这项措施的技术,法律和实践可能性进行了研究。我们的研究得出的结论是,由荷兰政府或代表荷兰政府部署过滤器并不是基于有关该方法有效性的任何已有知识。此外,荷兰执法当局的行动没有利用法律权力来过滤和阻止互联网流量。因此,发现荷兰的过滤行为是非法的。政府可以制定一项法律,赋予警察相关的权力。但是,儿童色情过滤器始终会造成一定程度的结构性过度封锁,这意味着政府随后会进行结构性封锁,这是不违法的信息。这将与《欧洲人权与基本自由公约》和国家立法所规定的基本权利相抵触。维护一个黑名单,该黑名单的大小非常大(有效的必要条件),同时又是最新且无错误的(防止过度阻塞所必需的),这是非常费力的工作,即使不是不可能的话保持。从荷兰国家警察政策的角度可以得出结论,将如此多的劳动用于维持黑名单不能被视为一项警察任务。荷兰警察为何随后开始过滤?在对儿童色情制品的评价令人讨厌的社会中,对安全性的重视程度高于对隐私权的重视程度,并且管理人员和政治人物经常对技术抱有天真的信念,反对使用儿童色情制品的互联网过滤器的倡导者迅速获得了广泛的支持。尽管本文提到了荷兰的局势,但其中也包含许多与其他欧洲国家有关的要素和问题。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Computer law & security report》 |2009年第3期|251-262|共12页
  • 作者单位

    NHL-Uniuersity of Applied Sciences Leeuwarden, Chair Cybersafety, The Netherlands Cybersafety Research and Education Network (CyREN);

    Free University Amsterdam, Computer Law Institute, The Netherlands Cybersafety Research and Education Network (CyREN);

    NHL-Uniuersity of Applied Sciences Leeuwarden, Chair Cybersafety, The Netherlands Cybersafety Research and Education Network (CyREN);

    NHL-Uniuersity of Applied Sciences Leeuwarden, Chair Cybersafety, The Netherlands Cybersafety Research and Education Network (CyREN);

    Free University Amsterdam, Computer Law Institute, The Netherlands Cybersafety Research and Education Network (CyREN);

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    internet; police; cybercrime; privacy; child pornography; child abuse;

    机译:互联网;警察;网络犯罪;隐私;儿童色情;虐待儿童;

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号