首页> 外文期刊>Computational economics >The Limits to Credit Growth: Mitigation Policies and Macroprudential Regulations to Foster Macrofinancial Stability and Sustainable Debt
【24h】

The Limits to Credit Growth: Mitigation Policies and Macroprudential Regulations to Foster Macrofinancial Stability and Sustainable Debt

机译:信贷增长的限制:缓解政策和宏观审慎法规以促进宏观金融稳定和可持续债务

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

In this paper we study an economy with a high degree of financialization in which (non-financial) firms need loans from commercial banks to finance production, service debt, and make long-term investments. Along the business cycle, the economy follows a Minsky base cycle with firms traversing through the various stages of financial fragility, i.e. hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance (cf., Minsky in The financial instability hypothesis: a restatement. Hyman P Minsky archive paper, vol 180, pp 541–552, 1978; Stabilizing an unstable economy. Yale University Press, 2nd edn 2008, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1986; The financial instability hypothesis. Economics working paper archive wp74. The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, 1992). In the speculative financial stage cash flows are insufficient to finance the repayment of principle but sufficient for paying interest, so banks are willing to roll-over credits in order to prevent loan defaults. In the Ponzi financial position even interest payments cannot be served, but banks my still be willing to keep firms alive through “extend and pretend” loans, also known as zombie-lending (Caballero et al. in Am Econ Rev 98(5):1943–1977, 2008). This lending behavior may cause credit bubbles with increasing leverage ratios. Empirical evidence suggests that recessions following such leveraging booms are more severe and can be associated to higher economic costs (Jordà et al. in J Money Credit Bank 45(s2):3–28, 2013; Schularick and Taylor in Am Econ Rev 102(2):1029–1061, 2012). We study macroprudential regulations aimed at: (i) the prevention and mitigation of credit bubbles, (ii) ensuring macro-financial stability, and (iii) limiting the ability of banks to create unsustainable debt bubbles. Our results show that limiting the credit growth by using a non-risk-weighted capital ratio has slightly positive effects, while using loan eligibility criteria such as cutting off funding to all financially unsound firms (speculative and Ponzi) has strong positive effects.
机译:在本文中,我们研究了高度金融化的经济,其中(非金融)公司需要从商业银行获得贷款来为生产,服务债务和长期投资提供资金。在整个经济周期中,经济遵循明斯基基本周期,企业会穿越金融脆弱性的各个阶段,即对冲,投机和庞氏金融(参见,《金融不稳定假设:重述》中的明斯基。HymanP Minsky存档文件,第180卷,第541–552页,1978年;《稳定不稳定的经济》,耶鲁大学出版社,2008年第2版,纽约麦格劳-希尔出版社,1986年;《金融不稳定假说》,经济学工作文件档案wp74。学院,1992)。在投机性财务阶段,现金流量不足以偿还本金,但足以支付利息,因此银行愿意结转信贷以防止违约。在庞氏骗局的财务状况中,甚至无法支付利息,但是银行仍然愿意通过“扩展和假装”贷款(也称为“僵尸贷款”)来维持公司的生存(Caballero等人,《美国经济评论》第98(5)版: 1943年至1977年,2008年)。这种借贷行为可能会随着杠杆比率的增加而引起信贷泡沫。经验证据表明,此类杠杆繁荣之后的衰退更为严重,并且可能与更高的经济成本相关联(Jordà等人,J Money Credit Bank 45(s2):3–28,2013; Schularick和Taylor在Am Econ Rev 102( 2):1029–1061,2012)。我们研究旨在:(i)预防和减轻信贷泡沫;(ii)确保宏观金融稳定;以及(iii)限制银行创造不可持续的债务泡沫的能力的宏观审慎法规。我们的结果表明,通过使用非风险加权资本比率来限制信贷增长会产生积极的影响,而使用贷款资格标准(例如切断对所有财务状况不佳的公司(投机性公司和庞氏骗局)的融资)会产生积极的影响。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号