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Organisational form and industry emergence: Nonprofit and mutual firms in the development of the US personal finance industry

机译:组织形式和行业兴起:美国个人理财行业发展中的非营利组织和共同公司

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Economic theories of commercial nonprofits and mutuals usually emphasise the advantages of such organisational forms in reducing agency and monitoring costs in markets that suffer from information asymmetries in exchanges between firms and their customers. This article examines the ability of such transaction cost theories to account for historical variations in the ownership and governance of firms in the US personal finance industry between the early nineteenth century and the Great Depression. It focuses, in particular, on mutual savings banks and their role in the development of the intermediated market for savings accounts. While I find some evidence in support of transaction cost theories of organisational form, I also find that entrepreneurial and socio-political factors played crucial roles in the choice of ownership and governance structures; mutual savings banks predominated in the early years of the industry because the form offered entrepreneurial advantages over investor-owned corporations and because in some states they benefitted from regulatory and political advantages that joint-stock companies lacked. Their relative decline by the early twentieth century was the result of increasing competition in the market for savings deposits, the loosening of regulatory barriers to entry, and changes in public policy that reduced the transaction, innovation and regulatory advantages that the mutual savings bank form had once held. The article draws out the theoretical implications for our understanding of the historical role of nonprofit and mutual firms.View full textDownload full textKeywordsnonprofit, trusteeship, mutual, cooperative, savings banks, governance, ownership, organisational form, entrepreneurship, innovationRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2011.613618
机译:商业非营利组织和共同体的经济理论通常会强调这种组织形式在减少代理和监控市场中的优势,这些市场在企业与客户之间的交易中存在信息不对称的情况。本文研究了这种交易成本理论解释19世纪初期到大萧条之间美国个人理财行业中公司所有权和治理历史变化的能力。它特别关注共同储蓄银行及其在储蓄账户中间市场发展中的作用。虽然我发现一些证据支持组织形式的交易成本理论,但我还发现,企业家和社会政治因素在所有权和治理结构的选择中起着至关重要的作用。互助储蓄银行在该行业的早期占主导地位,因为这种形式提供了优于投资者拥有的公司的创业优势,并且因为在某些州,它们受益于股份制公司所缺乏的监管和政治优势。到20世纪初,这种相对下降是由于储蓄存款市场竞争加剧,放松管制准入壁垒,以及改变了共同储蓄银行形式的交易,创新和监管优势的公共政策变化所致。一旦举行。本文为我们对非营利组织和共同公司的历史角色的理解提出了理论意义。查看全文下载全文关键词非营利组织,信托,托管,互助,合作社,储蓄银行,治理,所有权,组织形式,企业家精神,创新相关var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand :“ Taylor&Francis Online”,services_compact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more”,pubid:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2011.613618

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