The European Central Bank: A Holdout in the Heart of Europe?

摘要

The scope and the implications of the observations submitted by the ECB to the ECJ are still to be appreciated in full. They may be read either as a mere legal strategy to buttress the lawfulness of the OMT program before the ECJ, or as an indication of willingness to play an effective holdout role and to assert a de facto preferred status under a restructuring process. It is also unclear whether and to what extent this statement reflects a general practice of the ECB and thereby applies to purchases of sovereign bonds in the secondary markets not necessarily made under an OMT program or it is to be read as a mere exception to practice due to the formal waiver of preferred creditor status under the OMT. However, the same problem would arise with respect to the ECB's acceptance of being treated as any other bondholder under the EAP program, as long as this could imply the intention to play a holdout role also under this program.