The Negligence Rule in the Presence of Judicial Corruption and Social Norms

摘要

This paper investigates the phenomenon of judicial corruption and incorporates it into Polinsky, A. M. (1980). Strict liability vs. negligence in a market setting. American Economic Review, 70, 363-367 framework so as to analyze the efficiency of the negligence rule. By shedding light on the role of social norms in regard to the phenomenon of judicial corruption, this analysis provides implications for policy. First, more prevalent corruption at the status quo tends to intensify the extent of the corruption itself and, as a result, the effectiveness of the government's corruption enforcement is greatly lessened. This implies that an excessively lenient policy of corruption may result in an uncontrollable consequence; once corruption becomes rampant, it is costly to bring it down. Of great importance, in the presence of such a corruption effect, the social optimum cannot be achieved based on the negligence rule and the equivalence between the strict liability and negligence rule fails. Secondly, the attitude of the society toward a corrupt judge plays a crucial role in governing the effectiveness of an efficient wage arrangement. If the society can fully accept a corrupt judge, corruption will never be controlled even with the incentive wage scheme.